Considering the Private Animal and Damages by Cupp, Richard L., Jr.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 98 Issue 4 
2021 
Considering the Private Animal and Damages 
Richard L. Cupp Jr. 
Pepperdine University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Animal Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard L. Cupp Jr., Considering the Private Animal and Damages, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1313 (2021). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss4/11 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 












CONSIDERING THE PRIVATE ANIMAL  
AND DAMAGES 
RICHARD L. CUPP, JR.* 
ABSTRACT 
Since 2018, private law damages claims seeking to place animals in the 
role of plaintiffs have––in dramatic fashion––moved from academic debate 
to high-profile litigation. Focusing on two recent cases, this short Article 
asserts that lawsuits seeking to make animals plaintiffs in damages actions 
are much more than flashy news fodder; they raise profound policy issues 
that courts will struggle with into the foreseeable future. The most recent 
prominent case, Justice v. Vercher, is ongoing litigation seeking to 
designate a severely neglected horse as the plaintiff in a tort damages 
lawsuit against the horse’s owner. The second case, Naruto v. Slater, 
unsuccessfully sought to designate a monkey as the plaintiff in a copyright 
infringement lawsuit. Both cases illuminate significant implications of 
seeking to designate animals as plaintiffs in private law damages lawsuits. 
Thankfully, societal concern about animal welfare is rapidly increasing, 
although more needs to be done to protect animals. But efforts like Vercher 
and Naruto represent a societally harmful approach to animal protection. 
Such cases may continue to fail in the short term, but regardless of short-
term failure or success, analogous lawsuits are nevertheless likely to 
proliferate over time because the stakes are so high––success could be a 
back door to breaking down legal barriers between humans and animals. 
Further, as societal views regarding animals quickly evolve, the possibility 
of misguided rulings creating dangerous animal legal personhood through 
such lawsuits is real. 
 
* John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I thank Phil 
Goldberg and the participants in the 2019 Paris Remedies Discussion Forum at the Université Paris 
Dauphine PSL Research University for their helpful comments on a draft of this article. Part I of this 
article, addressing the case Justice v. Vercher, expands upon and includes portions of a public interest 
amicus curiae brief the author filed with the Oregon Court of Appeals.  
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This short article analyzes the policy implications and potential impact 
of two highly publicized recent cases seeking to make animals private law 
damages plaintiffs.1 Part I addresses potential implications of Justice v. 
Vercher,2 an Oregon case filed in 2018. In Vercher an animal rights 
organization put forward a neglected horse as a plaintiff to sue its former 
owner for tort damages in Oregon. This Part addresses why this lawsuit, 
although still in progress, presents dangerously sympathetic facts and is a 
particularly significant innovation by animal rights activists. This Part also 
articulates how allowing the horse to serve as a tort damages plaintiff would 
greatly harm society and why the radical step of making the horse a plaintiff 
is unnecessary to obtain justice in the case. 
Part II addresses how the Ninth Circuit’s 2018 ruling in the famous––or 
perhaps infamous––“monkey selfie” copyright case, Naruto v. Slater,3 
implicates the viability of future private law animal plaintiff damages 
lawsuits. This Part analyzes several ways in which the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision will appropriately impede future efforts to make animals damages 
plaintiffs, both in copyright and in other areas, such as torts. However, the 
enormous publicity generated by the facts and legal claims in Naruto is 
something of a wild card, and it is possible that this publicity could in some 
respects benefit animal plaintiff damages claims over time.  
The Conclusion concludes that––although future animal plaintiff 
copyright claims and future animal plaintiff tort claims are likely to follow 
somewhat different trajectories––they are related in the sense that they 
represent private law damages actions as a potential path to breaching the 
legal barrier between humans and animals. Attaining legal personhood for 
animals is perhaps the “holy grail” for some animal rights activists, and 
because the societal implications of success would be so dramatic, it seems 
likely that both Vercher and Naruto will serve as trailblazers for a growing 
wave of dangerous animal plaintiff damages lawsuits. 
I. JUSTICE V. VERCHER: VICTIMHOOD, PERSONHOOD, AND A RENAMED 
HORSE 
At first blush, asserting that abuse victims who can establish a sufficient 
degree of fault and reasonably foreseeable causation of harm should be 
 
1. This article focuses on animals as plaintiffs in private law damages actions. Animals are, of 
course, also sometimes relevant in other areas of private law not addressed in this article, such as divorce 
proceedings, wills, and trusts. 
2. Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 2018 WL 11189952, *1 (Or. Cir. May 1, 2018), appeal 
docketed, No. A169933 (Or. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2019). 
3. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 











entitled to tort damages from their abusers hardly seems controversial. But 
when the “victim” is a horse, allowing such a lawsuit would signal a 
dramatic change in our tort system and have societal implications well 
beyond tort law. 
In 2018 the Animal Legal Defense Fund (hereafter “ALDF”) filed 
Justice v. Vercher in Washington County, Oregon.4 After being dismissed 
by a trial court for lack of standing, the lawsuit is now progressing through 
the state’s appellate system.5 In the lawsuit, the ALDF asserts that a 
criminally neglected horse should be permitted to recover tort damages 
against its former owner.  
Scholars have previously debated the idea of tort damages lawsuits 
naming animals as plaintiffs,6 but the Vercher case is the most significant 
effort to date to shift the concept from the academy to the courthouse. For 
several reasons, the lawsuit has weighty implications.  
First, the context is novel and explosive. Most of the controversial 
lawsuits that have thus far unsuccessfully sought animal legal personhood 
in the United States in recent years––some of them still working their way 
through appellate courts––have focused on the particularly strong cognitive 
abilities of species kept by humans only in relatively small numbers 
(specifically, chimpanzees, cetaceans, and elephants), rather than focusing 
on the much broader capacity to suffer that creates the basis for identifying 
abused animals as victims for some purposes.7 If the Vercher claim were to 
succeed, potentially millions of animals’ legal status might change, with 
enormous financial and societal implications.8  
 
4. Vercher, 2018 WL 11189952, *1.  
5. Id. Pro Tem Judge John S. Knowles issued an Opinion Letter dismissing the lawsuit on 
September 17th, 2018, which is available online. Opinion Letter, Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 
2018 WL 11189952, *1 (Or. Cir. May 1, 2018), http://media.oregonlive.com/washingtoncounty_impact/ 
other/Justice%20ruling.pdf [https://perma.cc/48H8-PZQ4]. Given the prominence of the issues the case 
raises and its potential for creating change, it seems quite likely that regardless of the intermediate 
appellate court’s ruling, the case will be appealed further to the Oregon Supreme Court. 
6. For example, Professor David Favre provided a detailed proposal for allowing animals to be 
designated as tort lawsuit plaintiffs in David S. Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Interest of Animals––
A New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333 (2005). The author challenged this proposal in Richard L. 
Cupp, Jr., A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law Expansion and Limited Personhood as Stepping Stones 
Toward Abolishing Animals’ Property Status, 60 SMU L. REV. 3, 34–54 (2007). 
7. See, e.g., Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., 216 A.3d 839 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (rejecting legal personhood for elephants); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. 
Tommy v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), lv denied, 100 N.E.3d 846 (N.Y. 2018) 
(rejecting legal personhood for chimpanzees); People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 
124 A.D.3d 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), lv denied, 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015) (also rejecting legal 
personhood for chimpanzees); Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea 
World Parks & Ent., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (rejecting legal personhood for 
orcas).  












Second, the media have highlighted the case due to its unsettling facts 
and its novel legal theories, enhancing its potential for broad influence.9 
Third, Oregon’s legislature and courts have evidenced distinctive 
enthusiasm for legal reform that would provide better protection for 
animals.10 Thus far the state’s evolution has been positive, but this case will 
test whether Oregon’s courts might be tempted to step beyond animal 
welfare to accept radical animal rights dressed in the comfortingly routine 
language of following precedents.  
Fourth, the ALDF is perhaps the nation’s largest and most influential 
legal organization pressing for animal legal rights.11 The ALDF likely has 
the resources to pursue this case and perhaps future analogous cases 
aggressively, and it may have less of a credibility problem with the courts 
than would some other animal rights groups.  
Some jurisdictions have expanded civil remedies against animal abusers 
in recent years. However, this expansion has focused on awarding damages 
to pets’ owners against third parties who have intentionally abused the 
owners’ pets, rather than on providing civil remedies for the animals 
themselves.12 An overwhelming majority of courts deny pet owner 
emotional distress damages when a pet is negligently harmed or killed by a 
third party. However, some courts now allow such damages for intentional 
and malicious harm to another’s pet. Although rejecting owner emotional 
 
9. See, e.g., Karin Brulliard, Seeking Justice for Justice the Horse, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/08/13/feature/a-horse-was-neglected-
by-its-owner-now-the-horse-is-suing/ [https://perma.cc/MB9E-E9FB]; Neglected Oregon Horse Listed 
as $100K Lawsuit Plaintiff, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 3, 2018), https://apnews.com/04442857cc4c4eb0 
9efa72cad4e14cb6/Neglected-Oregon-horse-listed-as-$100K-lawsuit-plaintiff [https://perma.cc/43D7-
ZM49]; Joshua Rhett Miller, Horse Sues Former Owner for Negligence, Wants $100K, N.Y. POST (May 
3, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/05/03/horse-sues-former-owner-for-negligence-wants-100k/ [https:// 
perma.cc/A9LA-4UZC]; Brad Mielke & Pavni Mittal, A Horse Named Justice Sues Former Owner for 
More than $100,000 for Neglect, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2018, 3:28 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/horse 
-named-justice-sues-owner-100000-neglect/story?id=54880051 [https://perma.cc/7CY5-FZVN].  
10. See infra notes 31–70 and accompanying text.  
11. The ALDF asserts that its efforts “are supported by thousands of dedicated attorneys and 
more than 300,000 members and supporters.” About Us, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/abo 
ut-us/ [https://perma.cc/GB84-FLYC]. Some other groups promoting animal rights may have more 
members, but they do not exclusively focus on law. 
12. See, e.g., Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (considering the 
death of a cat caused by the defendants intentionally setting it on fire and granting plaintiff emotional 
distress damages based on defendants intentionally harming the cat but rejecting liability for the tort of 
outrage due to insufficient proof of intent to emotionally harm the plaintiff). 











distress damages is wise in negligence cases,13 allowing such damages when 
a pet is, with malice, intentionally harmed represents good legal reform. 14 
In Vercher the ALDF is––with much fanfare––urging Oregon’s courts 
to push the envelope much further. Utilizing Oregon legislation and case 
law, the ALDF contends that an animal’s purported “guardian” should be 
permitted to pursue damages against an animal’s abuser in the animal’s own 
name.15 In other words, the lawsuit in effect seeks to treat an animal as a 
legal person with a right to pursue civil remedies for tortious harms inflicted 
upon it.  
A. Dangerously Bad Facts 
Vercher’s facts are appalling. According to the complaint, defendant 
Gwendolyn Vercher owned the horse named as the plaintiff. At that time 
the horse was named Shadow.16 A neighbor called a horse rescue 
organization, requesting that the organization “take custody of [Shadow] 
because he was underfed and emaciated.”17 The neighbor also urged Ms. 
Vercher to take Shadow to a veterinarian to be evaluated. When Ms. 
Vercher took Shadow to a veterinarian, the veterinarian “observed that 
[Shadow]’s penis had prolapsed and could not retract because it was so 
swollen and heavy.”18 The veterinarian described the horse’s penis as “red 
[and] raw” and “oozing serum,” and the “skin was chapped and scabbed.”19 
Ms. Vercher later “surrendered” the horse to an organization named 
Sound Equine Options for care.20 The organization’s director took the horse 
to an equine hospital, where the horse was found to be 300 pounds 
underweight and suffering from “extreme emaciation.”21 Because the horse 
had been unable to retract his prolapsed penis into its sheath (“likely due to 
his severely debilitated body condition”), and was exposed to “chronic cold 
temperatures,” the horse “developed penile frostbite, which led to severe 
 
13. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking Up the Wrong Tree, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 1998, 12:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-jun-22-me-62429-story.html [https://perma.cc/X 
C8A-2KQH] (addressing reasons for opposing owner emotional distress damages in negligent harm 
cases). 
14. Cases involving intentional harm entail greater moral culpability, and, unlike negligence 
cases, do not risk causing indirect harm to animals through potentially increasing veterinary medical 
costs.  
15. Oregon has not designated the purported “guardian” named in the lawsuit as the horse’s legal 
guardian. The purported guardian is described in the complaint as “the Executive Director of Sound 
Equine Options” and as “the person responsible for Justice’s care and well-being.” Complaint at ¶ 5, 
Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 2018 WL 11189952, *1 (Or. Cir. May 1, 2018). 
16. Id. at ¶ 10. 
17. Id. at ¶ 11. 
18. Id. at ¶ 12. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at ¶ 14. 












trauma, infection, and scarring.”22 The treating veterinarian described the 
horse’s prolapsed penis as the most severe case he had ever treated.23 
Ms. Vercher pleaded guilty under Oregon’s anti-cruelty statute to neglect 
of the horse in the first degree.24 Her plea agreement included a requirement 
that she provide restitution to Sound Equine Options for expenses it had 
incurred for the horse’s care prior to July 6, 2017. However, the lawsuit 
asserts that “Defendant’s plea agreement does not include restitution for the 
cost of [the horse]’s care after July 6, 2017.”25 The complaint asserts that, 
because of its extensive injuries, the horse will require expensive care that 
would not otherwise be needed, including a likely partial amputation of his 
penis.26  
In a move lacking subtlety, prior to the lawsuit being filed, Shadow’s 
name was changed to “Justice.”27 The lawsuit pleads negligence per se 
based on violation of Oregon’s anti-cruelty statute and seeks––among other 
remedies––past costs of care incurred after July 6, 2017, future costs of care, 
and noneconomic damages.  
The complaint includes a photograph of Justice taken “immediately after 
he was rescued,”28 in which the horse appears to be in disturbing condition. 
The appalling facts asserted in the lawsuit make it more difficult and 
dangerous than a case with milder circumstances would be, because the 
emotions that bad facts arouse sometimes lead to bad law. Allowing an 
animal rights organization such as the ALDF to pursue civil remedies in the 
name of an animal––in effect creating legal personhood for animals––would 
be exceptionally bad law. 
B. Distinguishing Victimhood and Legal Personhood 
Courts, of course, decline to grant civil remedies unless the plaintiff has 
standing to sue.29 The ALDF seeks to build legal personhood for the horse 
renamed Justice on Oregon case law recognizing that, for some purposes, 
an animal may be viewed as a crime victim. The ALDF asserts that crime 
victims have the right to sue their abusers in civil court, and because Oregon 
 
22. Id. at ¶¶ 17–18. 
23. Id. at ¶ 18. 
24. Id. at ¶ 32. 
25. Id. at ¶ 33. 
26. Id. at ¶ 27. 
27. See Brulliard, supra note 9. 
28. Complaint at 2, Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 2018 WL 11189952, *1. 
29. See, e.g., Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., 216 A.3d 839 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (rejecting lawsuit seeking elephant legal personhood because neither the 
advocacy group seeking recognition of elephants as legal persons nor the elephants themselves had 
standing to sue). 











law views animals as victims in the context of abuse, Justice should be able 
to assert a tort claim in Oregon.30 
Four interesting Oregon cases form the foundation of the ALDF’s 
argument that a horse may pursue tort remedies. In 2014, the Oregon 
Supreme Court decided State v. Nix.31 In Nix, police officers acted on a tip 
that animals were being neglected at the defendant’s farm. At the farm, they 
found dozens of emaciated horses and goats, along with the bodies of other 
animals that had perished.32 A jury convicted the defendant of twenty counts 
of second-degree animal neglect involving twenty separate animals.33 At 
sentencing, the state sought to impose twenty separate convictions, one for 
each neglected animal.34 The trial judge rejected this request, ruling that 
under the relevant Oregon animal neglect statute animals cannot be treated 
as individual “victims.”35 An intermediate appellate court and the Oregon 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the legislature intended to protect 
animals when it enacted the statute and thus that animals may be considered 
victims under the statute for purposes of obtaining multiple convictions for 
neglect of multiple animals.36  
Nix was later vacated on procedural grounds, but its reasoning was 
adopted by an Oregon appellate court in State v. Hess.37 In Hess, the 
defendant was convicted of forty-five counts of animal neglect for “failure 
to provide minimum care for her cats.”38 At sentencing, the defendant 
argued that the court should merge all forty-five counts into a single 
conviction, “because the cats were her property and, thus, not victims, 
leaving only one victim of her crimes––the public.”39 The trial court had 
rejected this argument, treating each neglected cat as a separate victim and 
imposing forty-five convictions on the defendant.40 The appellate court 
upheld the trial court’s ruling, simply explaining that Nix previously 
addressed the same issue, and that Nix was persuasive.41 
Like in Vercher, the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v. 
Fessenden42 involved a neglected horse. In Fessenden, the defendants’ 
neighbors reported to the police that the defendants’ horse, which was kept 
 
30. Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 2018 WL 
11189952, *1. 
31. State v. Nix, 334 P.3d 437 (Or. 2014), vacated, 345 P.3d 416 (Or. 2015). 




36. Id. at 439. 
37. State v. Hess, 359 P.3d 288 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). 
38. Id. at 289.  
39. Id. at 292. 
40. Id. at 290.  
41. Id. at 293. 












in a pasture visible to the neighbors, appeared to be starving.43 When an 
officer with specialized training in animal husbandry and animal cruelty 
arrived at the scene, he observed the horse from a driveway shared by the 
neighbors and recognized signs of emaciation and kidney failure.44 The 
officer believed that the horse might fall and suffer a potentially fatal injury 
if he took the time needed to obtain a warrant to enter the defendants’ 
property.45 Thus, the officer entered the property without a warrant and 
seized the horse to take it to a veterinarian.46  
The defendants moved that the court should suppress evidence that was 
obtained after the officer’s seizure of the horse because the officer failed to 
obtain a warrant before entering their property, as required by the Oregon 
Constitution and United States Constitution.47 The state asserted two 
exceptions to the warrant requirement: the exigent circumstances exception 
and the emergency aid exception.48 The exigent circumstances exception 
requires the state to prove both probable cause and exigency; the emergency 
aid exception requires only exigency.49 
For the emergency aid exception in Oregon to apply, an officer must 
reasonably believe that a warrantless search, seizure, or entry is necessary 
“to render immediate aid to persons . . . who have suffered, or who are 
imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or harm.”50 
The court emphasized that the emergency aid exception requires that the 
victim be a “person” and promptly punted on addressing whether it applied. 
The court concluded that it did not need to decide whether the emergency 
aid exception applied, because it found the officer’s warrantless action 
justified under the exigent circumstances exception.  
The court highlighted that, unlike the emergency aid exception, the 
exigent circumstances exception may be used to prevent serious damage to 
property.51 Further, it noted an Oregon statute finding that “[a]nimals are 
sentient beings capable of experiencing pain, stress and fear.”52 Although it 
left open the possibility that “the day may come when humans perceive less 
separation between themselves and other living beings than the law now 
reflects,”53 the court made clear that animals are property under the law and 
 





48. Id. at 280, 281–82. 
49. Id. at 281–82. 
50. Id. (quoting State v. Baker, 260 P.3d 476 (Or. 2011)). 
51. Id. at 282. 
52. Id. at 283 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305(1) (2019)). 
53. Id. at 284. 











therefore are not treated the same as humans.54 However, because Oregon 
law protects animals from neglect, an animal may be a “victim” in 
circumstances calling for application of the exigent circumstances exception 
to the search warrant requirement.55 In other words, although an animal may 
be property, it is not mere property under Oregon law. Rather, it is a 
protected form of property that Oregon recognizes as capable of suffering 
pain and garnering protection under Oregon’s animal neglect statute. 
Finally, in 2016 the Oregon Supreme Court addressed another Fourth 
Amendment unconstitutional search claim related to a conviction under 
Oregon’s animal neglect statute. In State v. Newcomb, the defendant was 
convicted of second-degree animal neglect after failing to adequately feed 
her dog, which had caused the dog to become malnourished.56  
A police officer had gone to the defendant’s home to investigate a report 
that she was abusing and neglecting her dog. While at the home, the officer 
saw the defendant’s dog and reasonably suspected that the dog was 
malnourished.57 He took custody of the dog and asked a veterinarian to 
examine it.58 Acting without a warrant, the veterinarian took a blood sample 
from the dog to confirm that it was emaciated from malnutrition and not a 
parasite or other medical condition.59  
The blood test ruled out other causes of the dog’s emaciation, and the 
state used this evidence in obtaining an animal neglect conviction against 
the defendant.60 The defendant asserted that this warrantless blood test of 
her dog constituted an illegal “search” of her property and that the blood 
test must be excluded from evidence.61  
In rejecting this argument, the Oregon Supreme Court provided its most 
elegant analysis to date regarding animals’ status as a unique, protected 
form of property. In reaffirming animals’ property status, the court cited an 
Oregon statute that expressly states: “Dogs are hereby declared to be 
personal property.”62 However, the court continued, an animal is far 
different than inanimate property. For example, “[u]nder Oregon law, there 
are many exceptions to a person’s ability to lawfully own and possess 
certain animals.”63 
 
54. Id. at 283. 
55. Id. at 286. 
56. State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 435–36 (Or. 2016). 
57. Id. at 436. 
58. Id. at 437. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 437–38. 
62. Id. at 440 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 609.020 (2019)). 












Further, the law affords animals many protections that distinguish them 
from inanimate property. Indeed, “Oregon’s animal welfare statutes impose 
one of the nation’s most protective statutory schemes.”64 This reflects 
Oregon’s statutory recognition that animals have special status as sentient 
beings.65 Although Oregon law “does not place [animals] on a par with 
humans,”66 the court was careful to note, “[w]hat matters here is that Oregon 
law prohibits humans from treating animals in ways that humans are free to 
treat other forms of property.”67 Humans’ obligations regarding animal 
welfare, therefore, “have no analogue for inanimate property.”68 
Because of animals’ protected status, their owners have no right to 
block––in the name of privacy––appropriate steps to investigate whether 
their animals have been unlawfully neglected.69 Thus, the court rejected the 
defendant’s effort to exclude her dog’s blood evidence as a violation of 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections. 
Newcomb may be on the legal frontier, but it is not on the legal fringe. 
Rather, it is a well-reasoned decision reflecting desirable societal evolution 
toward providing more protection for animals without falling off the deep 
end and declaring that animals are legal persons. Indeed, the Association of 
Prosecuting Attorneys, the National District Attorneys Association, and the 
Oregon Veterinary Medical Association––hardly fringe animal rights 
groups––joined the ALDF in an amicus curiae brief urging the court to 
uphold the defendant’s conviction.70 
All four of the Oregon cases discussed above reflect well on the state’s 
appellate courts. Each is thoughtful and innovative rather than reckless or 
overreaching. Legislation and case law need to evolve to reflect growing 
societal concern for animals’ welfare, and these cases are exemplary. 
Because each animal protected by Oregon’s animal neglect laws is capable 
of suffering, neglecting multiple animals should call for more punishment 
than neglecting a single animal. Further, although animals are appropriately 
viewed as a form of property in Oregon, they are the most unique of our 
multiple forms of property because they require protection from 
unnecessary suffering. This need to protect animals from unnecessary 
suffering should influence property search and seizure rules, as they have in 
these Oregon cases. But seeking to use Oregon’s thoughtful animal welfare 
evolution as a justification for, in effect, the radical concept of animal legal 
 
64. Id. at 440 (quoting State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278 (Or. 2014)). 




69. Id. at 443. 
70. Id. at 435. 











personhood is quite dangerous, and it risks a step backward for animal 
protection. 
C. A Horse Is a Horse, of Course, of Course––but It Is Not a Table or a 
Chair 
Adopting animal legal personhood as a mechanism to provide for 
ongoing medical expenses as a damages remedy in the Vercher case would 
represent dramatic overkill and would create harmful societal 
consequences. It is also unnecessary for the protection of neglected animals. 
Some aspects of the chaos and harm that would be caused by such a judicial 
holding may be unforeseeable prior to such a leap in the dark. Some of the 
most significant foreseeable problems associated with making animals tort 
plaintiffs are addressed below. 
1. Inviting Potentially Massive, Unmanageable, and Societally 
Harmful Litigation 
If courts adopted the ALDF’s theory in Vercher, a massive pool of other 
animals as potential plaintiffs would be created. If lawyers then asserted that 
even some of those animals were neglected or abused, animal rights activists 
could flood the courts with a huge volume of lawsuits and assert to represent 
the new legal persons. Further, if animal legal personhood were accepted in 
this context, litigation would doubtlessly spread quickly to lawsuits 
challenging biomedical research on such “persons,” any commercial use of 
such “persons,” and even pet ownership of such “persons.” 
Throughout the United States, varying degrees of legal protection against 
abuse or neglect apply to virtually all mammals (and some non-mammals, 
such as birds) that are under the control of humans. Not only horses, but 
dogs, cats, cows, pigs, sheep, mice, rats, and a large range of other animals 
may thus be viewed as “victims” of neglect or abuse. Viewing them as such 
is a good thing under Oregon’s present approach to animal victimhood; for 
example, it can facilitate harsher sentencing for the mistreatment of multiple 
animals than the mistreatment of one animal, regardless of whether the 
animal is a horse or some other kind of protected animal. However, if courts 
allow this helpful evolution to bootstrap legal personhood for all animals 
protected from abuse, they would create a pool of hundreds of millions or 
perhaps billions of potential new tort law plaintiffs eligible to sue if lawyers 
allege they were neglected or abused.  
The American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals asserts that 












States.71 But clearly, the scope of potential new plaintiffs is much broader. 
In 2012, the American Veterinary Medical Association estimated that 
approximately 149 million pet dogs, cats, and horses live in the United 
States.72 There are approximately 95 million cattle73 and 73 million hogs 
and pigs in the United States.74 These five species alone, all of which are 
the subject of legal protections against abuse or neglect, exist in the United 
States in numbers almost equivalent to its human population.75 The ALDF 
estimates that 9 billion animals are raised and used for food in the United 
States each year.76 Opening up the courts to this vast number of potential 
plaintiffs would invite extreme societal disruption. 
Further, ambitions related to the Vercher case may go far beyond 
allowing animals alleged to be victims to file torts lawsuits. An ALDF press 
release issued when it initiated Vercher stated that “existing laws still lag 
far behind our current understanding of animal sentience by classifying 
animals as property.”77 
This appears to reflect a position not only that abused animals should be 
legal persons, but also that sentient animals’ property status should be 
abolished altogether. If animals capable of suffering pain were no longer 
classified as a form of property, potential implications for food sources, 
scientific research, animal-based products, and the economy in general 
would be monumental. If the first proposed jump is made––a mammal is a 
legal person for purposes of abuse and neglect laws––the second jump to 
arguing that a legal person cannot be eaten or held “captive” for any human 
uses is obvious.  
A group of law professors filed an amicus curiae brief (hereafter 
“Professors’ Brief”) in the Vercher appeal describing the legal relief sought 
in this case as “modest, entirely in-step with an emerging jurisprudence of 
 
71. A Closer Look at Animal Hoarding, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/animal-
hoarding/closer-look-animal-hoarding [https://perma.cc/ 3AA4-NJEC].  
72. See Market Research Statistics – U.S. Pet Ownership 2012, AVMA, https://www.avma.org/r 
esources/reports-statistics/market-research-statistics-us-pet-ownership-2012 [https://perma.cc/KF8K-G 
LXE]. 
73. See Rob Cook, Cattle Inventory, BEEF2LIVE (Nov. 13, 2020), http://beef2live.com/story-unit 
ed-states-cattle-inventory-124-108177 [https://perma.cc/JZ3A-T848].  
74. See United States Hog Inventory Up 3 Percent, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Mar. 29, 2018), https:/ 
/www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/2018/03_29_2018-1.php [https://perma.cc/37KH-BJLB].  
75. The combined number of these five species in the United States is approximately 317 million. 
The United States’ human population is approximately 329 million. See U.S. and World Population 
Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
76. Farmed Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/focus_area/farmed-animals/ [h 
ttps://perma.cc/82JL-2VDX]. 
77. Press Release, Animal Legal Def. Fund, Groundbreaking Lawsuit Argues Animals Have the 
Right to Sue Their Abusers in Ct. (May 1, 2018), https://aldf.org/article/groundbreaking-lawsuit-argues-
animals-right-sue-abusers-court/ [https://perma.cc/8ERF-5ANW]. 











animal law, and consistent with the best reading of Oregon’s existing law.”78 
This is incorrect. As demonstrated above, the legal relief sought in this case 
has enormous and dangerous policy implications best left to the legislature 
to consider.79  
The Professors’ Brief asserts that “the full-scope of personhood 
protections owed to domesticated animals need not be decided” in this 
case.80 But this effort to minimize the impact of assigning legal personhood 
to a horse is ineffective. Of course a panoply of extensions would be sought 
if the barrier between animals and legal persons was breached in a case like 
Vercher, and considering the extent of a legal ruling’s consequences cannot 
simply be left for later.  
Further, even in the short term, the focus of the Professors’ Brief on 
domesticated animals does not significantly limit the potential impact of 
animal personhood. As documented above, domesticated animals might 
number in the billions in the United States. Cattle have been considered 
domesticated for at least 10,000 years.81 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
lists sheep as an illustration of a domestic animal (defined as “any of various 
animals (such as the horse or sheep) domesticated so as to live and breed in 
a tame condition”).82 Pigs have been domesticated for approximately 9,000 
years.83  
In its briefing for the appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the ALDF 
sought to refute the trial court’s astute observation that allowing this lawsuit 
to proceed “would likely lead to a flood of lawsuits whereby non-human 
animals could assert claims we now reserve just for humans and human 
creations such as businesses and other entities.”84 The ALDF alleged that 
the floodgate-of-litigation concern is unpersuasive because lawsuits would 
only be available for conduct that is already illegal.85 This is far from 
reassuring. 
 
78. Animal Law Professors Amicus Curiae Brief at 3–4, Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 
2018 WL 11189952, *1 (Or. Cir. May 1, 2018), appeal docketed, No. A169933 (Or. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 
2019) (on file with author). 
79. See supra note 71–76 and accompanying text. 
80. Animal Law Professors Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 78, at 5. 
81. See Daniel Pitt et al., Domestication of Cattle: Two or Three Events?, 12 EVOL APPL. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 123, 124 (2019). 
82. Domestic Animal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dom 
estic%20animal [https://perma.cc/F9PF-HB3C]. 
83. See Elizabeth Pennisi, The Taming of the Pig Took Some Wild Turns, SCIENCE MAG. (Aug. 
31, 2015), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/08/taming-pig-took-some-wild-turns [https://perma. 
cc/GN4M-B7TK].  
84. Opinion Letter, supra note 5, at 1.  
85. Appellant’s Opening Brief and Excerpt of Record at 25–28, Justice v. Vercher, No. 
18CV17601, 2018 WL 11189952, *1 (Or. Cir. May 1, 2018), appeal docketed, No. A169933 (Or. Ct. 












There is no assurance that an animal would be considered a legal person 
and capable of bringing a lawsuit only in cases where there was a correlating 
criminal conviction for abuse or neglect. Sadly, the number of animals 
abused and neglected is doubtlessly much higher than the number of 
criminal convictions for such abuse and neglect. Thus, considering the 
number of criminal abuse and neglect cases prosecuted at present is not a 
useful predictor of how many civil lawsuits might be brought. If hundreds 
of millions or billions of beings are granted the potential to stand as 
plaintiffs, torts lawsuits for even a relatively small percentage of 
domesticated animals could have a dramatic impact. As noted above, 
approximately 250,000 animals are victims of animal hoarding alone in the 
United States.86 
Finally, particularly for lawyers who morally oppose the use of animals 
for scientific research or food, an incentive would be created to pursue 
lawsuits that might have the effect of discouraging such uses in addition to 
protecting abused or neglected animals. Further, it seems likely that lawyers 
pursuing such claims will seek to be paid. Of course, most torts lawsuits are 
pursued on a contingency fee basis. Creating a financial incentive for 
finding and pursuing abuse or neglect claims––some of which would relate 
to legitimate abuse or neglect and some of which would perhaps not be 
meritorious––would further expand the number of potential lawsuits that 
could arise from a legal-personhood ruling in Vercher.  
2. Legislatures and “Extraordinary Steps” 
The ALDF’s briefing in Vercher emphasizes Oregon’s strong animal 
protection statutes as a foundation for creating animal legal personhood.87 
But none of these statutes took the “extraordinary step”88 of directing that 
an abused or neglected animal should have standing as a legal person to 
bring a torts lawsuit. As noted above, the societal implications of assigning 
legal personhood to animals could be dramatic (to say the least). Policy 
decisions with broad societal consequences should generally be left to 
democratically elected legislatures with strong fact-finding resources. The 
Oregon legislature’s failure––or refusal––to declare that animal neglect 
victims should be legal persons capable of bringing torts lawsuits speaks 
loudly. As stated by the Ninth Circuit in an analogous context regarding 
federal legislation in Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, “if Congress and the President 
intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as 
 
86. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
87. Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
88. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). 











people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so 
plainly.”89 
3. Animals as Property, but Not “Mere” Property 
Oregon’s legislature and courts have not been vague regarding animals’ 
property status; they have clearly confirmed it. As recently as 2016, the 
Oregon Supreme Court confirmed in Newcomb that “[u]nder Oregon's 
statutes, animals . . . are deemed ‘property.’”90 Further, as noted above, an 
Oregon Revised Statute (hereafter “ORS”), section 609.020, expressly 
states that “[d]ogs are hereby declared to be personal property.”91 As the 
ALDF’s press release quoted above reveals, the animal rights organization 
seems to hope that this case will help eliminate animals’ property status. But 
this goal is contrary to the will of Oregon’s elected legislature as expressed 
in ORS § 609.020.  
Property is a highly flexible legal concept that can be molded for many 
purposes. Oregon’s case law expanding protections for animals recognizes 
this. For example, as addressed above, Newcomb was unequivocal in 
affirming that Oregon law “does not place [animals] on a par with 
humans,”92 but it also recognized that “[w]hat matters here is that Oregon 
law prohibits humans from treating animals in ways that humans are free to 
treat other forms of property.”93 The special protections afforded to animals, 
the Oregon Supreme Court determined, “have no analogue for inanimate 
property.”94 
 Unhappily for reasoned analysis, to many people, the term “property” 
conjures images of inanimate objects that may be used in any way the owner 
wishes. Thus, attributing a property status to animals is easily 
misunderstood as implying heartless disregard for their welfare. In reality, 
viewing animals as a specially protected form of property permits a 
balancing of animals’ utilities to humans and animals’ susceptibility to pain 
and suffering––and their distress if neglected or abused. Problems do not 
arise because of animals’ property status; they arise at one extreme from 
failure to protect this quite special form of property and at the other extreme 
from harmful efforts to reject the entire property paradigm rather than 
evolve within it.  
 
89. Id. 
90. State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 441 (Or. 2016) (quoting State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278 
(2014)). 
91. OR. REV. STAT. § 609.020 (2019). 














4. Discouraging Animal Protection Reforms by Legitimizing Slippery 
Slope Concerns  
Activists’ overreach in seeking to use sensible pro-animal legal evolution 
to leverage radical upheaval strengthens the “give an inch and they’ll take a 
mile” narrative that often seems to underlie opposition to desirable pro-
animal reforms. In 2018 I argued against overusing slippery slope concerns 
to resist many animal-protection legal reforms in an article entitled Edgy 
Animal Welfare.95 In the article, I acknowledged the slippery-slope problem 
that many animal welfare legal reforms could be used as a stepping-stone 
toward radical and harmful animal legal personhood. However, the article 
asserted that reforms are needed and that animal welfare proponents should 
engage in case-by-case balancing of slippery-slope risks and animal-welfare 
benefits in deciding whether to support or oppose proposed legal changes.96 
If the benefit of the expanded protection outweighs the likelihood that it 
would cause us to slip down a slope toward harmful animal legal 
personhood, animal welfare proponents should support the expansion. In 
other words, animal welfare proponents need to accept some reasonable 
risks of overreach to achieve positive evolution that will help animals. They 
need to support some “edgy” animal welfare proposals.  
Oregon’s pro-animal protection legislation and the pro-animal Oregon 
court rulings addressed in this article are, on their own merits, highly 
laudable animal welfare reforms. But Vercher provides a textbook 
illustration of pushing measured animal welfare court rulings and legislative 
reforms toward a slippery slope to the radical notion of animal legal 
personhood. If the court were to find that a horse is a legal person who can 
file a lawsuit, other states contemplating improvements to animal welfare 
protection might be discouraged from doing so due to concerns about 
creating a slippery slope toward radical animal rights.  
The benefits of Oregon’s pro-animal legislative and common law 
reforms thus far outweigh their risks. However, if Oregon was to accept the 
ALDF’s dramatic overreach in Vercher as an extension of its earlier pro-
animal reforms, the author’s Edgy Animal Welfare thesis would perhaps 
reflect some degree of naiveté. Such a ruling would likely be pointed to as 
a cautionary tale by many animal personhood opponents when addressing 
otherwise sensible reform efforts ostensibly based on animal welfare rather 
than on animal personhood. Seeking to use thoughtful animal welfare 
reforms as a springboard to animal legal personhood may harm––rather than 
help––important animal welfare reform efforts.  
 
95. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Edgy Animal Welfare, 95 DENV. L. REV. 865 (2018). 
96. Id. at 874–76. 











5. Legal Personhood’s Connection to a Norm of Moral Agency 
Sufficient to Bear Legal Accountability 
In recent years at least three appellate courts have unanimously rejected 
animal legal personhood because animals do not possess, individually or as 
a norm, sufficient moral agency to be legally accountable, and legal rights 
are intertwined at a broad but deep level with a norm of legal duty.97 As 
Judge N. R. Smith put it simply in his concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s 
Naruto v. Slater “monkey selfie” copyright ruling, “[p]articipation in 
society brings rights and corresponding duties.”98 The attribution of legal 
personhood to infants and other humans with significant cognitive 
limitations is not pernicious speciesism or irrational biological prejudice; 
rather, it is anchored in their statuses as members of the human community, 
where sufficient moral agency to be legally accountable is the norm.99 As 
explained in the 2017 New York intermediate appellate decision Nonhuman 
Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery: 
Petitioner argues that the ability to acknowledge a legal duty or legal 
responsibility should not be determinative of entitlement to habeas 
relief, since, for example, infants cannot comprehend that they owe 
duties or responsibilities and a comatose person lacks sentience, yet 
both have legal rights. This argument ignores the fact that these are 
still human beings, members of the human community.100  
Further, the court recognized that corporate personhood does not reflect 
that the word “person” is a mere term of art, as corporations are proxies for 
humans.101  
 
97. See Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., 216 A.3d 839, 846 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2019) (rejecting animal legal personhood for elephants and emphasizing that they are 
“incapable of bearing legal duties, submitting to societal responsibilities, or being held legally 
accountable for failing to uphold those duties and responsibilities”); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex 
rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73, 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), lv denied, 100 N.E.3d 846 (N.Y. 
2018) (noting that “nonhumans lack sufficient responsibility to have any legal standing”); People ex rel. 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d 148, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), lv denied, 38 
N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015) (recognizing that “the ascription of rights has historically been connected with 
the imposition of societal obligations and duties”). 
98. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 432 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018) (Smith, J., concurring in part). 
99. The author develops this analysis at length in Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Cognitively Impaired 
Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465 (2017) [hereafter Cognitively 
Impaired Humans], and in Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments from 
“Marginal” Cases, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2013). 
100. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73, 78 (N.Y App. Div. 
2017), lv denied, 100 N.E.3d 846 (N.Y. 2018). 












6. A Straightforward Animal Welfare Solution 
Creating animal legal personhood is not necessary to address the medical 
care funding problem presented in cases such as Vercher. Straightforward 
solutions are available within an animal welfare paradigm. When the 
defendant in Vercher reached a plea bargain agreement for criminal animal 
neglect, the court only required that the defendant pay for the medical care 
and other expenses caused by the neglect up to a specific date.102 However, 
the complaint in Vercher asserted that further medical care and neglect-
related expenses have been incurred since that date and that yet more 
expenses would be incurred in the future.103 The complaint asserted that tort 
damages, with the horse as a legal-person plaintiff, were needed to obtain 
the neglect-related expenses that were already incurred and would be 
incurred after the cut-off date set forth in the criminal sentencing.104 
Simply, the horse owner’s payment of medical and other neglect-related 
expenses should not have been allowed to end as of the date of her plea 
bargain. Assuming it was within the court’s power, the plea bargain should 
have required the owner to pay future neglect-related expenses in addition 
to past neglect-related expenses. If, for some reason, courts presently do not 
have the power under Oregon law to require payment of future neglect-
related expenses in plea bargains, the Oregon legislature should explore 
amending its animal neglect statutes to allow for this. The extraordinary step 
of creating animal legal personhood, however, is not justified, and it is 
especially inappropriate when straightforward approaches within our 
existing legal framework are available. 
D. Oral Argument Before the Oregon Court of Appeals 
In September 2020, a panel of the Oregon Court of Appeals heard oral 
arguments in the Vercher case.105 Interestingly, many or most of the 
appellate judges’ questions for the attorneys focused on exploring what 
distinctions exist between animals and humans with little or no moral 
agency, such as infants, for purposes of considering the boundaries of legal 
personhood. The panel’s questions focused less on some of the more 
mundane grounds for rejecting the ALDF’s appeal––that creating legal 
 
102. Complaint, supra note 28, at ¶ 33.  
103. Id. at 13 (Prayer for Relief). 
104. Id. 
105. Oral Argument, Justice v. Vercher, No. 18CV17601, 2018 WL 11189952 (Or. Cir. May 1, 
2018), appeal docketed, No. A169933 (Or. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2019), https://oregoncourts.mediasite.com/ 
mediasite/Play/e92bf836cddb47a98f73c597194129161d?catalog=7451ecdd054e43ee9f338460558f78f
e21. Regardless of how the Court of Appeals rules, it seems quite likely that the losing party will next 
appeal the case to the Oregon Supreme Court. 











personhood is not needed to require an animal abuser to pay for an animal’s 
ongoing medical expenses under existing Oregon law,106 or that upending 
Oregon’s legal system in the manner sought by the lawsuit would generate 
a host of complex implications best considered by the state’s legislature.  
Perhaps these grounds for rejecting the ALDF’s lawsuit were not the 
subject of much questioning because they are more mundane or familiar. In 
any event, more discussion of the significance of humans’ distinctive norm 
of sufficient moral agency to be appropriate subjects of legal accountability 
as a basis for legal personhood may have been useful in the oral argument. 
As noted above, ascribing legal personhood to humans with limited moral 
agency, but not to animals, is not irrational speciesism––rather, it is 
anchored in the distinctive interconnectedness of the human community, 
where strong moral agency is the norm.107 The 2017 New York intermediate 
appellate decision in Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. 
Lavery emphasized that membership in the human community is what 
grounds the legal personhood of infants and other humans lacking strong 
cognitive capacities.108 
For example, when an adult chimpanzee at the Los Angeles Zoo 
intentionally killed an infant chimpanzee in 2012 by smashing its head, the 
killer was certainly not prosecuted for murder under our human legal 
system.109 As I set forth in a 2017 article:  
 Among the beings of which we are presently aware, humans are 
the only ones for whom the norm is capacity for moral agency 
sufficiently strong to fit within our society’s system of rights and 
responsibilities. It may be added that no other beings of which we are 
presently aware living today, for example, the most intelligent of all 
chimpanzees, ever meet that norm. Recognizing personhood in our 
fellow humans, regardless of whether they meet the norm, is a pairing 
of like “kind” where the “kind” category has special significance––
the significance of the norm being the only creatures who can 
rationally participate as members of a society with a legal system 
such as ours. 
 Morally autonomous humans have unique natural bonds with 
other humans who have cognitive impairments, and thus denying 
 
106. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
108. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73, 78 (N.Y App. Div. 
2017), lv denied, 100 N.E.3d 846 (N.Y. 2018).  
109. See Adult Chimpanzee Kills Baby Chimp in Front of Shocked Los Angeles Zoo Visitors, CBS 
NEWS (June 27, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/adult-chimpanzee-kills-baby-chimp-in 
-front-of-shocked-los-angeles-zoo-visitors/ [https://perma.cc/BK83-LL54]. The author discusses this 












rights to them also harms the interests of society––we are all in 
community together. Infants are human infants, and persons with 
severe cognitive impairments are humans who are other humans’ 
parents, siblings, children, or spouses. We have all been children, and 
we relate to children in a special way. Further, we all know that we 
could develop cognitive impairments ourselves at some point in our 
lives, and this reminds us that humanity is the most defining 
characteristic of persons with cognitive impairments.110 
II. NARUTO V. SLATER: DAMNING ANIMAL PLAINTIFFS, BUT PRESENTING 
MIXED POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Naruto v. Slater,111 the famous “monkey selfie” case that garnered even 
more media attention than Vercher, may be an enigma regarding its 
implications for animals as private law plaintiffs seeking damages. At 
surface, the case was disastrous for animal copyright lawsuits and harmful 
to tort damages lawsuits. However, although the case likely destroyed the 
possibility of animal copyright for the foreseeable future, the lawsuit’s long-
term impact on animal tort damages lawsuits may be complex.  
In 2011 David Slater, a professional photographer, left his camera 
unattended in an animal reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia.112 A 
crested macaque monkey named Naruto picked up Mr. Slater’s camera and 
took photographs of himself with it.113 Mr. Slater and his corporate partners 
published the “monkey selfies” and claimed copyright ownership of the 
photographs.114 
In 2015 PETA and an individual who later withdrew from the lawsuit 
sued Mr. Slater and his corporate partners in the Northern District of 
California for copyright infringement.115 PETA and the individual who 
initially joined with PETA in the lawsuit claimed to be acting as next friends 
on behalf of the monkey.116 The court noted that “[t]he complaint does not 
allege any history or relationship between PETA and Naruto.”117  
The District Court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the complaint did 
not establish standing under the Copyright Act or under Article III of the 
 
110. Cognitively Impaired Humans, supra note 99, at 506 (citations omitted). 
111. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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monitored, and studied Naruto since his birth.” Id. When Dr. Engelhardt later withdrew from the 
litigation, only PETA remained to assert itself as the monkey’s next friend. Id. at 421. 











U.S. Constitution,118 and a Ninth Circuit panel unanimously affirmed the 
dismissal.119  
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of PETA’s arguments for standing could 
have been relatively straightforward. The court found itself to be bound by 
the earlier Ninth Circuit decision Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush,120 which it 
interpreted as holding that an Article III case or controversy may exist in a 
lawsuit brought on behalf of an animal only if standing is granted by a 
statute.121  
The complaint in Cetacean “alleged concrete physical injuries caused by 
the Navy’s sonar systems in a suit brought by the ‘self-appointed attorney 
for all of the world’s whales, porpoises, and dolphins.’”122 The Cetacean 
court dismissed the lawsuit because the cetaceans lacked standing under the 
specific environmental statutes at issue in the case, but it stated that “Article 
III does not compel the conclusion that a statutorily authorized suit in the 
name of an animal is not a ‘case or controversy.’”123  
Based on this precedent, the Naruto court held that an animal may have 
Article III standing even without a next friend representative if a statute 
grants such standing, but Congress did not grant standing to animals in the 
Copyright Act (and has not in any other statute).124 The court also held that 
PETA lacked standing to serve as the monkey’s next friend because 
Congress has not authorized next friend standing for animals.125 
The Naruto decision was complicated by a disagreement between the 
panel’s judges regarding Cetacean’s scope as precedent. As noted above, 
the court’s opinion viewed Cetacean as creating binding precedent that an 
animal may have Article III standing even without a next friend if expressly 
provided in a statute, but it found that the Copyright Act does not provide 
such standing.126 In his concurring opinion, Judge N.R. Smith agreed that 
the Copyright Act does not allow standing for animals, but he disputed the 
majority’s determination that Cetacean required the court to allow the 
possibility of Article III standing for animals if a statute were to expressly 
evidence congressional intent to grant such standing.127  
In essence, the majority seemed to strongly believe that PETA should 
lose on multiple grounds: PETA had no standing as a next friend, and 
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121. Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420–21. 
122. Id. at 424 (quoting Cetacean, 386 F.3d at 1171). 
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124. Naruto, 888 F.3d at 425–26. 
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regardless, animals do not have standing under the Copyright Act.128 The 
concurrence asserted, with considerable passion, that PETA should also lose 
for a third reason: lawsuits with asserted animal plaintiffs do not have case-
or-controversy standing under Article III.129 Thus, the majority appeared 
hostile toward PETA’s lawsuit, and Judge Smith’s concurrence appeared to 
reflect even stronger hostility. The court awarded attorneys’ fees against 
PETA.130 Along with other disparaging commentary, Judge Smith 
condemned the lawsuit as frivolous and wrote that the majority decision 
“highlights” that frivolity in its treatment of the merits.131  
A. Naruto’s Negative Implications for Animal Plaintiff Damages Lawsuits 
Naruto’s negative implications for damages lawsuits naming animals as 
plaintiffs are numerous. Several of the most significant negative 
implications include: 
1. Likely Destroying the Possibility of Animal Plaintiffs in Copyright 
Lawsuits into the Foreseeable Future  
Naruto is likely fatal to any animal rights activists’ hopes for animal 
plaintiff copyright lawsuits, at least into the foreseeable future. Under 
Naruto’s holding, animals may stand as copyright plaintiffs only if 
Congress amends the Copyright Act to expressly allow such standing.132 
Given current societal views regarding animals’ legal status, such an 
amendment to the Copyright Act seems exceptionally unlikely. The Ninth 
Circuit denied a request from one of the panel judges to consider the case 
en banc.133 Further, the Supreme Court and the other federal circuits, all of 
which are generally viewed as more conservative than the Ninth Circuit, 
likely would not find Copyright Act standing for animal plaintiffs where the 
Ninth Circuit has so vigorously rejected it. 
2. Highlighting the Connection between Rights and a Norm of Duty 
that Plagues Animal Personhood Lawsuits 
The connection between rights and a norm of duties for legal persons has 
beleaguered several lawsuits seeking animal legal personhood, and both the 
 
128. Id. at 421–26 (majority opinion). 
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majority and concurrence in Naruto supported this criticism.134 Judge 
Smith’s concurrence asked: “Are animals willing to assume the duties 
associated with the rights PETA seems to be advancing on their behalf?”135 
In a footnote, he expanded on his question by noting that “[p]articipation in 
society brings rights and corresponding duties.”136 Further,  
[t]he right to own property is not free from duties. One must pay taxes 
on profits from a royalty agreement for use of a copyrighted image. 
Are animals capable of shouldering the burden of paying taxes? 
Similarly, all people have a duty to obey the law and, for example, 
not commit intentional torts. Should animals be liable for intentional 
torts as well? The concept of expanding actual property rights—and 
rights broadly—to animals necessitates resolving what duties also 
come with those rights and, because animals cannot communicate in 
our language, who stands in their shoes?137 
The majority recognized Judge Smith’s concerns about the connection 
between rights and duties––and other problems with Article III standing for 
animals––and it noted that “Judge Smith reaches the reasonable conclusion 
that animals should not be permitted to sue in human courts. As a pure 
policy matter, we agree.”138 Although the majority disagreed with Judge 
Smith’s argument about the precedential value of Cetacean, it expressed 
approval of his substantive concerns––including his concern that the 
interconnection between rights and duties is problematic for those seeking 
to make animals rights-bearing plaintiffs. 
This language from the majority and the concurrence in Naruto add 
weight to the conclusions of a growing number of appellate courts that have 
recently decided cases regarding animal legal personhood. These courts 
have determined that animals cannot be legal persons because they do not 
have humans’ norm of sufficient moral agency to accept the responsibilities 
that are related to rights in human society.139 Because only legal persons 
(including human proxies, such as corporations) may be plaintiffs in 
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damages lawsuits, this language from Naruto will doubtlessly be cited in 
opposition to future attempts to name animals as plaintiffs in damages 
lawsuits. 
3. Strongly Condemning the Assumption that Animal Rights Groups 
May Effectively Serve as Animals’ Next Friends 
Naruto strongly condemned the assumption that animal rights groups 
may effectively serve as animals’ next friends in lawsuits seeking to name 
animals as damages plaintiffs. Once again, Judge Smith’s concurring 
opinion was stinging. He highlighted that “[a]nimal-next-friend standing is 
particularly susceptible to abuse”140 and that allowing it would provide “no 
means or manner to ensure the animals’ interests are truly being expressed 
or advanced.”141 He believed that  
[s]uch a change would fundamentally alter the litigation landscape. 
Institutional actors could simply claim some form of relationship to 
the animal or object to obtain standing and use it to advance their own 
institutional goals with no means to curtail those actions. We have no 
idea whether animals or objects wish to own copyrights or open bank 
accounts to hold their royalties from sales of pictures. To some 
extent, as humans, we have a general understanding of the similar 
interests of other humans.142 
Judge Smith’s concerns were not merely theoretical; he brought his 
argument home by applying it specifically to PETA’s conduct in the lawsuit. 
With an artfully placed footnote following the final word of his concurrence, 
Judge Smith tore into PETA’s treatment of the monkey for whom it had 
asserted next-friend status.143 Although PETA had asserted it would “fulfill 
the duties of a next friend” to Naruto, after experiencing a presumably 
hostile reception at oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, PETA “changed 
its tune.”144 After this oral argument experience, PETA moved to dismiss 
the appeal and vacate the lower court’s judgment. A settlement had been 
agreed upon, but Justice Smith stated that it was “unlike a normal 
settlement,” because the plaintiff––Naruto––was not a part of the 
agreement.145 Rather, “his purported next friend, PETA, settled its own 
claims.”146 Judge Smith continued:  
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It remains a mystery to me what “claims” PETA (a non-party) could 
settle. Nevertheless, even though PETA only settled its own claims, 
it maintained that “the settlement also renders moot the appeal filed 
on behalf of the Plaintiff Naruto.” Indeed, PETA went so far as to 
claim “[t]here is thus no longer any live case or controversy before 
this Court.”  
 Though it had previously attested it would “fulfill[ ] the duties of 
a next friend,” PETA forgot its self-appointed role. “A ‘next friend’ 
does not [itself] become a party to the ... action in which [it] 
participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of [the party in 
interest].” Whatever PETA did or did not do for Naruto (it only made 
representations to this court regarding what it obtained), PETA made 
sure to protect itself and with the [motion to dismiss the appeal and 
vacate the lower court’s judgment] sought to manipulate this court to 
avoid further negative precedent contrary to its institutional 
objectives.147 
Judge Smith bitingly concluded: “It is clear: PETA’s real motivation in 
this case was to advance its own interests, not Naruto’s,” and therefore that 
“PETA used Naruto as a ‘pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard larger 
than his own case.’”148  
On this issue, the majority’s opinion slammed PETA even harder than 
Judge Smith. After echoing Judge Smith’s criticism by stating that PETA 
had “abandoned Naruto’s substantive claims in what appears to be an effort 
to prevent the publication of a decision adverse to PETA’s institutional 
interests,”149 the majority went even further. It addressed the possibility of 
a lawsuit against PETA by Naruto: “Were he capable of recognizing this 
abandonment, we wonder whether Naruto might initiate an action for breach 
of confidential relationship against his (former) next friend, PETA, for its 
failure to pursue his interests before its own.”150 
In addition to painting an unflattering picture of PETA, this unusually 
harsh take-down by a federal appellate court could be harmful to future 
animal rights groups’ efforts to utilize next-friend standing in future 
damages lawsuits. It will remind courts of the danger introduced in Naruto: 
a purported next friend might be tempted to put its agenda interests ahead 
of a specific animal’s interests. It will also remind courts of the difficulty in 
ascertaining what a member of a different species would want in many––or 
any––situations.  
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4. Criticizing the Cetacean Decision and Calling for a Ninth Circuit 
En Banc Decision or for the Supreme Court to Overrule It  
Although Naruto’s majority opinion interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s 2004 
Cetacean decision to hold that animals may have standing under Article III 
if Congress clearly evidences intent to confer statutory standing, the panel 
made clear that it disapproved of Cetacean. The majority bemoaned that it 
could not overrule Cetacean, but it noted that “[w]hat we can do is urge this 
court to reexamine Cetacean.”151 
In the short term, this plea for removing any possibility of animal 
standing seems likely to fail. As noted above, the Ninth Circuit declined one 
of the Naruto judge’s requests to hear the case en banc,152 thus obviating the 
immediate threat of a decision that would potentially overrule Cetacean. 
Further, Naruto was not appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
similarly avoiding any danger that the Supreme Court would overrule 
Cetacean. However, animal standing cases will doubtlessly arise again in 
the federal courts. Even if Naruto could not overrule Cetacean’s generous 
interpretation of potential animal standing, its powerful rebuke of Cetacean 
may influence future cases addressing this issue. 
5. Equating “Persons” with Humans and Their Proxies 
The Naruto court at least implied that a legal person is a human or a 
human proxy, such as a corporation. For example, Judge Smith’s 
concurrence noted that  
the Federal Rules only authorize next friend suits on behalf of “a 
minor or an incompetent person.” Per the text, this can only apply to 
human persons, not any “minor” or “incompetent” corporations or 
animals. Importantly, the historical background of [the next friend 
statute] limits the use of next friends to only human persons.153 
Of course, corporations are also legal persons, but the court recognized 
that they are merely proxies for humans: “[C]orporations and 
unincorporated associations are formed and owned by humans; they are not 
formed or owned by animals.”154 
Naruto’s apparent nod to the exclusively human foundation of legal 
personhood impliedly precludes the treatment of animals as legal persons in 
private law damages actions. The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., an 
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organization focused on expanding legal personhood to at least some 
animals, acknowledged and complained about Naruto’s implicit limitation 
of personhood––contending, of course, that the court was wrong.155 But 
despite complaints from animal rights activists, this aspect of Naruto adds 
to a growing body of cases that point out the centrality of humanity to legal 
personhood in response to efforts to name animals as plaintiffs.156 
B. Naruto’s Nuanced Potential for Emboldening Animal Plaintiff 
Damages Lawsuits 
Although Naruto’s more obvious implications for animals as private law 
damages plaintiffs are negative, only time will tell whether the case’s impact 
is completely one-sided. The possibility, albeit questionable, that a case so 
strongly rejecting animal damages actions might ultimately further them in 
some respects is interesting to consider. 
1. Bad Publicity as Good Publicity? 
For better or for worse, the Naruto case garnered enormous attention. As 
stated by one writer: “Naruto’s case raised intriguing legal questions and 
stole the public’s attention.”157 Although PETA lost the case and was 
chastised by the court, the organization was unapologetic. After the 
litigation concluded, a PETA spokesperson said that “PETA’s 
groundbreaking ‘monkey selfie’ case sparked a massive international 
discussion about the need to extend fundamental rights to animals for their 
own sake, not in relation to how they can be exploited by humans.”158 
PETA is open about using “controversial tactics” to gain media 
attention.159 The organization asserts that “[i]t is sometimes necessary to 
shake people up in order to initiate discussion, debate, questioning of the 
status quo, and, of course, action.”160 
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Thus, although the Ninth Circuit strongly criticized PETA and awarded 
attorneys’ fees against the organization, PETA can assert that it succeeded 
in drawing attention to its perspective on animals’ legal status. If the maxim 
that no publicity is bad publicity is correct, PETA may have––in this 
regard––won. However, the maxim’s validity is subject to debate, and 
measuring the long-term impact of publicity is nearly impossible. The 
possibility that the lawsuit’s publicity could, over time, advance the 
argument for animals as damages plaintiffs seems unlikely, but is worthy of 
acknowledgement. 
2. Power to File––and Lose––Lawsuits Claiming to Represent 
Animals 
Finally, the Naruto case could be interpreted as empowering animal 
rights groups to file lawsuits with animal plaintiffs––even though those 
lawsuits will likely fail absent express congressional intent to allow them. 
Judge Baker decried this empowerment of activists––who may not, in his 
view, be relied upon to act as appropriate next friends––as harm caused by 
the majority’s approach in Naruto. He complained that the majority’s broad 
interpretation of Cetacean “allows PETA (with no injury or relationship to 
the real party in interest) to sue on Naruto’s behalf, because it obtained legal 
counsel to allegedly represent Naruto.”161 Although the court ruled that even 
with Article III standing, animals do not have statutory standing absent 
express congressional intent to grant it, Judge Baker remained concerned 
about allowing advocacy groups to bring more animal plaintiff lawsuits. 
“Unfortunately,” he concluded, “PETA’s actions could be the new normal 
under today’s holding.”162  
Regardless of whether actions such as those PETA took in Naruto 
become the “new normal,” advocates seeking to make animals plaintiffs in 
damages lawsuits will certainly cite the case’s acceptance of Article III 
standing for animals in future cases.163 How much impact the case will have 
on that point remains to be seen––it is much easier for a court to say animals 
have potential standing in a case like Naruto, which presented other grounds 
for rejecting such standing, than in a case for which Article III standing 
would be determinative. 
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Vercher and Naruto seem to presage different but related trajectories for 
animal tort damages lawsuits and animal copyright damages lawsuits. Even 
if Vercher fails at the Oregon Court of Appeals and/or the Oregon Supreme 
Court, efforts to name animals as plaintiffs in state law tort lawsuits will 
probably expand in its wake. One state’s rejection of a torts claim does not 
preclude other states from eventually allowing such a claim. Recognition of 
the momentous “payoff” for animal rights activists that would result from 
an animal torts plaintiff being recognized as a legal person—breaching a 
presently insurmountable divide between humans and animals—is 
sufficiently dramatic to incentivize activists to continue bringing such 
lawsuits in the meantime, despite low odds for success in the short term.  
Naruto seems to close the door more definitively for animal copyright 
damages claims in the foreseeable future, although such claims were highly 
dubious even before the decision. However, as with Vercher, the potential 
for radical change in animals’ legal status if a federal law damages claim 
were to prevail is likely sufficiently enticing for animal rights activists, that 
future federal statutory lawsuits should be expected. In several respects, the 
Naruto decision appropriately pushed the concept of animal plaintiff 
damages lawsuits backward rather than forward. However, whether the 
publicity generated by the Naruto lawsuit will soften opposition to animal 
legal personhood over time remains to be seen. In any event, the court’s 
determination that animals have Article III standing will be citation-fodder 
for future lawsuits initiated by animal rights activists. 
Courts should continue to reject efforts to make animals private law 
damages plaintiffs. As stated in the theme song to the 1960’s sitcom Mr. Ed, 
“A horse is a horse, of course, of course”––but that is not a slight to 
horses.164 And treating a monkey like a monkey is likewise not a slight. 
Horses, monkeys, and other animals are much different from tables, chairs, 
and other inanimate property. Animals capable of suffering require vigorous 
protection, and our legal system needs to continue evolving to create better 
animal welfare laws and enforcement. But unless courts continue their 
appropriately evolving focus on human responsibility for thoughtful animal 
welfare reform, rather than succumbing to a rising tide of lawsuits seeking 
to treat animals as if they were persons, the future could be a jungle.  
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